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ABSTRACT
Private Webmail 2.0 (Pwm 2.0) improves upon the cur-
rent state of the art by increasing the usability and prac-
tical security of secure email for ordinary users. More
users are able to send and receive encrypted emails with-
out mistakenly revealing sensitive information. In this
paper we describe four user interface traits that posi-
tively affect the usability and security of Pwm 2.0. In
a user study involving 51 participants we validate that
these interface modifications result in high usability, few
mistakes, and a strong understanding of the protection
provided to secure email messages. We also show that
the use of manual encryption has no effect on usability
or security.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent measurements demonstrate that email is largely
insecure [8, 6, 11]. Although adoption of connection-
based encryption and authentication is increasing (i.e.,
STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC), these technologies
are often configured incorrectly and have weaknesses
that render them susceptible to attacks. However, even
if transmission of email were properly secured, email
at rest is generally unencrypted. This means that an
honest-but-curious email provider or a government that
coerces an email provider into granting access can poten-
tially scan email messages. End-to-end encryption is a
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much stronger protection mechanism. With end-to-end
encryption, the sender encrypts email messages before
transferring them to the email provider, ensuring that
no one but the intended recipients is able to read the
messages.
Unfortunately, usable secure email is still an open prob-
lem more than 15 years after Whitten and Tygar’s sem-
inal paper, Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt [26].1 Arguably
the most secure form of end-to-end encryption is PGP,
but PGP has continually proved itself unusable [26, 21,
15]. More recently, research has shown that by relaxing
the security requirements of PGP, it is possible to cre-
ate usable, secure email [10, 16, 1]. While these newer
systems have lower theoretical security than PGP, they
have higher practical security—meaining these new tools
allow ordinary users to encrypt their email, something
they are largely unable to do with PGP-based tools.
Of these usable, secure email systems, Private Webmail
(Pwm) is specifically targeted at helping the masses en-
crypt their existing webmail accounts, such as those pro-
vided by Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. A set of user
studies of Pwm demonstrated that it had significantly
higher usability than similar secure webmail systems
(Encipher.it and Voltage Mail [16]). Still, in this evalu-
ation of Pwm about a tenth of participants accidentally
sent email in the clear when they meant to encrypt it.
Many more users were unsure of the security provided
by Pwm.
In this paper, we describe an improved interface design
for Pwm that addresses issues raised in the original stud-
ies. First, we added an artificial delay to encryption that
enhances users’ confidence in the strength of the mes-
sage encryption while simultaneously instructing users
on who can read encrypted messages. Second, we modi-
fied the email composition interface to help users under-
stand which emails are encrypted, so that they avoid
mistakenly sending plaintext in the clear. Third, we
added contextual clues that help users understand how
to correctly use secure email, showing how the recipient,
subject, and optional greeting fields are used. Finally,
we implemented inline, context-sensitive tutorials, which
improved view rates for tutorials from less than 10% for
Pwm to over 90% in some cases for Pwm 2.0. Through
a user study involving 51 participants, we demonstrate
1We note that S/MIME is widely used in certain organi-
zations (e.g., U.S. government), but this adoption has not
spread to the masses.
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that our new design, referred to as Pwm 2.0, is signifi-
cantly more usable and secure than Pwm.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1. We describe the interface modifications we used to
build Pwm 2.0. Our user study demonstrates that
these modifications had a significant impact on the
usability and security of Pwm 2.0 as compared to the
original Pwm system. Moreover, we discuss user re-
actions to these interface modifications and lessons
learned from our study. We believe these principles
could also benefit other encryption applications (e.g.,
instant messaging, social networks, file sharing).
2. Pwm 2.0 scores an 80.0 on the System Usability Scale
(SUS), rating in the “excellent” category for usability
and receiving an “A” grade. This score is in the 87th
percentile for system usability [18] and is the highest
SUS score for secure email to date. Moreover, over
80% of users wanted to immediately begin using Pwm
2.0, and over 90% felt that their friends and family
could use Pwm 2.0 with relative ease.
3. We show that with Pwm 2.0 users rarely send plaintext
messages when they meant to encrypt the message.
Out of 306 tasks, only six mistakes were made using
Pwm 2.0 (2%), a significant improvement to Pwm’s
rate of about 10%. In addition, the majority of users
understood the confidentiality, authenticity, and in-
tegrity Pwm 2.0 provided their messages (84%, 63%,
76%, respectively).
4. As part of our study, we split users into two groups
using different versions of Pwm 2.0 supporting either
automatic encryption or manual encryption. Our re-
sults demonstrate that, contrary to the findings of the
original Pwm study [16], requiring a user to view their
encrypted message before sending it (manual encryp-
tion) has no benefit over encrypting and sending the
message in one step (automatic encryption).
BACKGROUND
In this section, we review related work for secure email
and automatic versus manual encryption. We then de-
scribe the threat model that motivates our work. Finally,
we describe the original Private Webmail system.
Related Work
Whitten and Tygar [26] conducted the first formal user
study of a secure email system (i.e., PGP 5). They found
serious usability issues with key management and users’
understanding of the underlying public key cryptogra-
phy. Subsequent studies of newer PGP-based clients
have shown that PGP tools are still unusable for the
masses [21, 15].
Garfinkel et al. [10] conducted a usability study of secure
email based on S/MIME, and observed that hiding en-
cryption details can impact usability. For example, they
found that because the integration of encryption into
Outlook Express “was a little too transparent,” users
were often unsure whether a given email was encrypted.
Additionally, they found that some users failed to read
the instructions associated with various visual indica-
tors, leading to difficulties in understanding the inter-
face. Still, they found that automating key management
increased the overall usability of secure email.
Fahl et al. [7] explored manual and automatic encryp-
tion in the design of a Facebook Chat system. Here,
automatic encryption refers to encrypting and sending a
message without explicitly demonstrating that encryp-
tion has occurred, whereas manual encryption shows the
user ciphertext and requires them to manually send this
ciphertext. Their user study demonstrated that users re-
ported preferring automatic key management, but found
no significant difference between automatic and manual
encryption. Nevertheless, they raised the issue that au-
tomatic encryption could impact users’ feelings of trust
and recommended the issue be addressed in future work.
Ruoti et al. [16] conducted a series of user studies with
Private Webmail (Pwm), a secure email prototype that
tightly integrates with Gmail. Even though results
showed the system to be quite usable, they found that
some users made mistakes and were hesitant to trust the
system since the automatic encryption was too trans-
parent. They also conducted a study comparing Pwm
to a desktop application (MP) that supported manual
encryption. They found that participants using MP’s
manual encryption made fewer mistakes and answered
more questions correctly on a quiz that tested their un-
derstanding of the system. However, there are significant
differences between Pwm and MP, which are confound-
ing factors in Ruoti et al.’s results. In this paper, we also
examine the differences between automatic and manual
encryption, but do so using two variants of our Pwm 2.0
system that only differ in regards to the use of automatic
and manual encryption.
Atwater et al. [1] have also examined the question of au-
tomatic and manual encryption brought up by Ruoti et
al.’s study. They created two version of a tool based on
Mailvelope, and these versions only differed in their us-
age of manual and automatic encryption. They found
that manual encryption had no statistically significant
effect on participants’ trust of their secure email sys-
tem. Their work differs from ours in that they examined
the question of trust whereas we are looking at under-
standing and mistakes, the two pivotal points from the
original Pwm study. In addition, though Atwater et al.
demonstrate usability with a PGP-based client, the sys-
tem they simulated does not include several practical
key management steps that users would be required to
perform, limiting the applicability of its results.
Threat Model
In our threat model there are four entities:
1. User. The user’s computer, operating system, and se-
cure email software are considered part of the trusted
computing base.
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2. Webmail provider. We consider the webmail
provider as an honest-but-curious party.2 The web-
mail provider has access to the users’ encrypted mes-
sages, but not to the keys that encrypt those messages.
3. IBE Key server. Key management in Pwm uses
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [20]. In IBE, a user’s
public key can be computed using public parameters
from the IBE key server and the user’s identity (e.g.,
email address). To retrieve the private key for a given
identity, a user proves ownership of the appropriate
identity, and then the key server will generate and
send the private key to the user.3
We consider the IBE key server as an honest-but-
curious party. While the key server is responsible for
generating a user’s private key, it does not have access
to the messages encrypted with those keys.
4. Adversary. The adversary is free to eavesdrop on any
communication between users, webmail providers, and
key servers.4 Additionally, the adversary can attempt
to compromise the webmail provider or key server.
The adversary wins if she is able to use these resources
to access the plaintext contents of the encrypted email
body.
We do not consider attacks directly against the user or
trusted computing base (i.e., phishing credentials, in-
stalling malicious software). Similarly, we do not con-
sider an attacker who can compromise fundamental net-
working primitives (i.e., TLS, DNS). While these are
valid concerns, if the attacker can accomplish these types
of attacks, then they can already do far more damage
than they could by breaking the secure email system.
We also note that data needed by the webmail provider
to transmit email (e.g., recipient addresses) cannot be
encrypted, and may be available to the adversary (e.g.,
this information is passed over an unencrypted channel).
Our threat model instead focuses on ensuring the data
in the encrypted body is safe from an attacker.
To steal the user’s sensitive data, the adversary must
obtain both the encrypted email and the key material
needed to decrypt the email. The former can be accom-
plished by either compromising the webmail provider, or
intercepting an encrypted email that is not transmitted
using TLS. The latter can be accomplished by compro-
mising the IBE key server. Just as the adversary must
collect the data from both the webmail provider and key
server, neither of these parties alone has enough informa-
tion to unilaterally steal the user’s sensitive data. While
2An honest-but-curious party will gather any information
available to them (e.g., Gmail scans email messages), but
will not attempt to break the secure email system (e.g., im-
personating the user to the key server) or collude with other
honest-but-curious parties).
3Private keys are not stored on the key server, but rather
generated on demand based on a master secret. For added
security, this secret can be stored inside of a crypto-card.
4In nearly all cases, this communication will be encrypted us-
ing TLS, and the adversary only has access to the encrypted
packets.
as honest-but-curious parties, these two entities will not
collude, a government could subpoena both organiza-
tions and compromise a user’s sensitive data. If this is
a significant concern, it is possible to apply a threshold-
ing scheme to the IBE key server and place the various
key servers in different localities that for political reasons
will not cooperate.5
While our threat model is more permissive than the tra-
ditional PGP threat model, it is nonetheless useful in a
variety of situations. For example, it satisfies the typi-
cal case where a small business or a university has out-
sourced its email to a third-party service provider such
as Google, but does not trust Google with sensitive data.
The business or university does, however, trust a browser
extension that it has vetted and a key server that it
operates. Alternatively, our threat model allows every-
day users to easily encrypt sensitive email, preventing
their webmail providers from storing, scanning, or acci-
dentally leaking sensitive information. Regardless, the
model provides greater assurance than currently avail-
able through vanilla SMTP [6].
Private Webmail (Pwm)
Pwm implements secure email through tight integration
with Gmail and leverages automatic key management.
When users read or compose secure email, Pwm replaces
portions of Gmail’s interface with Pwm’s own secure
interface. Pwm’s interfaces are styled differently than
Gmail’s, providing a clear demarcation of which infor-
mation is being protected by Pwm. Pwm’s interfaces
are implemented using security overlays [25]. Security
overlays allow Pwm’s interfaces to be visually integrated
within Gmail’s interface, while still protecting the con-
tent of Pwm’s overlays from Gmail.6
All secure email sent using Pwm includes instructions
on how to setup Pwm for first-time users. The setup
instructions direct new users to the Pwm website, where
they are able to add a bookmarklet to their browser’s
bookmark storage.7 The new user then returns to Gmail
and clicks on the Pwm bookmarklet to run Pwm. The
benefits of using a bookmarklet to run Pwm include not
requiring installation permission on the machine and also
avoiding any user worries related to installing exten-
sions [16]. The drawback is that users are required to
click on the Pwm bookmarklet each time they reopen
Gmail.
When Pwm is running, secure email messages are auto-
matically decrypted for users. The decrypted contents
of the message are displayed in place of the instructions
5Alternatively, the IBE key server could roll over its keys on
a regular (e.g., daily) basis, limiting the amount of time an
adversary or a government has to steal the user’s sensitive
data.
6This prevents Gmail from being curious and scanning the
contents of encrypted emails.
7A bookmarklet is a browser bookmark that contains exe-
cutable JavaScript. This JavaScript is run on the page that
users are viewing when the bookmark is clicked.
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Figure 2. An encrypted email in the inbox
Figure 1. The read interface for an encrypted email.
and ciphertext that were in the email message’s body
(Figure 1).8 Encrypted email messages in the user’s in-
box are marked as Encrypted (Figure 2). Pwm allows
users to add encryption on a per-message basis by click-
ing a lock icon inserted next to the “Send” button at the
bottom of the compose interface.
In Pwm, users are authenticated to the IBE key server
using Simple Authentication for the Web (SAW) [24], a
form of email-based authentication [9]. Since Pwm runs
inside the user’s Gmail session, it is able to complete au-
thentication automatically and does not need to prompt
the user for input. It should be noted that because Pwm
authenticates to the IBE key server using email, if an ad-
versary were to compromise the user’s webmail account
they would also be able to authenticate to the key server.
This means that messages encrypted with Pwm are only
as secure as the user’s webmail account. Ruoti et al.
took this approach in order to maximize usability and
because it still provides greater security than currently
available to webmail users [8, 6, 11]. If greater secu-
rity is needed, the IBE key server could be modified to
authenticate users by some other means (e.g., separate
password, two-factor authentication).
USABILITY IMPROVEMENTS
We used an iterative design methodology to address
problems with Pwm’s original interface. For each prob-
lem, we brainstormed several potential solutions and
evaluated each solution using cognitive walkthroughs
and heuristic evaluations. The most promising solutions
were then implemented in prototypes, and these proto-
types were evaluated with pilot usability studies con-
ducted with a convenience sample from friends, family,
and students. Those solutions that were rated as helpful
in our pilot usability studies were then implemented in
our Pwm 2.0 system. The source for Pwm 2.0 can be
found at https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/pwm.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the most
relevant solutions that were added to Pwm 2.0.
8Screenshots in this section are of Pwm 2.0.
Delayed Encryption
One concern expressed by a significant portion of par-
ticipants in the original Pwm study [16] was that Pwm
encrypted email so quickly that participants were unsure
if Pwm had really done anything. Also, participants in-
dicated the encryption process was so invisible that they
were unsure who could read their encrypted email mes-
sage.
To address both of these problems we added an arti-
ficial delay after users click the Send encrypted or En-
crypt buttons. For each email recipient, users are shown
a message lasting 0.75 seconds that states the email
is being encrypted for that user (e.g., “Encrypting for
bob@gmail.com”). This helps users understand who will
be able to read the encrypted email and also lets them
feel that something substantial has happened during the
encryption process.9 Because most email messages have
a small number of recipients, this artificial delay does
not significantly impact the overall email experience.
Compose Interface
In the original studies, about 10% of users accidentally
sent a sensitive email without first encrypting it. In each
case, the user recognized that they had made a mistake
immediately after hitting the send button, but unfor-
tunately their sensitive information had already been
transmitted in the clear. Moreover, many users initially
composed their sensitive emails in plaintext, only en-
crypting them right before sending the message, allowing
Gmail to scan their message as it was being typed.
To address both of these issues, we revised Pwm 2.0’s
compose interface to better conform to the flow of com-
posing email messages in Gmail (i.e., moving from top
to bottom). As part of this process, we added informa-
tive text at the top of the compose interface (before the
data entry sections) that indicates to users whether their
message is being encrypted, then allows them to enable
encryption before they begin composing their message
(Figure 3). When encryption is enabled, we modify the
informative text to make it clear that the message is now
being encrypted (Figure 4). Furthermore, we modified
Gmail’s Send button to read Send unencrypted, to make
it clear to users that by default their messages are sent
without encryption.
To help users better understand how Pwm 2.0 protects
their emails, we modified the placeholder text for the
Recipients and Subject fields, explaining how Pwm 2.0
uses these two fields (Figure 4). Also, we added function-
ality allowing users to compose plaintext greetings that
9Future work could examine the effect of removing this delay
for experienced users who already have a correct understand-
ing of the system’s functionality. Additionally, a maximum
delay length could be set for large recipient lists.
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Figure 3. Gmail compose interface before enabling en-
cryption
Figure 4. Pwm’s compose interface
are included with the encrypted email (Figure 1 and Fig-
ure 4).10 The greeting can help engender trust in a new
user that receives an encrypted email, giving them confi-
dence to setup and use Pwm 2.0. It also provides context
for encrypted email messages before they are decrypted.
Tutorials
Several of the problems encountered by participants in
the original studies could have been avoided if they had
viewed the included video tutorial. As participants were
clearly uninterested in reading the instructions or watch-
ing a video on the Pwm website, we replaced these with
integrated, context-sensitive tutorials in Pwm 2.0. These
tutorials provide step-by-step instructions on how to use
Pwm 2.0, are displayed the first time a user performs
a new action, and are shown directly to the side of the
interface the user is currently using. Each step in the tu-
torials uses simple language and instructs the user about
a single feature of Pwm 2.0 (Figure 5). Some tutorial
steps require explicit action from users before they can
move on to the next step, helping users internalize cor-
rect behavior (Figure 6). The tutorials are as follows:
1. Introduction. This tutorial is shown to users the
first time they run Pwm 2.0. It informs users that
Pwm 2.0 will help protect their email and tells them
how to identify whether Pwm 2.0 is running.
10This feature was first suggested by Ruoti et al. [16], but was
not actually implemented.
Figure 5. Style of the tutorial window
Figure 6. Tutorial waiting for action from the user
2. Read. The first time users read an encrypted email
message, they are shown this tutorial. The tutorial
shows users how to identify an encrypted email, ex-
plains the plaintext greeting, and identifies which por-
tions of the email message were encrypted. Addition-
ally, it informs them that email messages encrypted
with Pwm 2.0 are provided authenticity and confiden-
tiality (even from Gmail).
3. Compose. The first time users compose an email
message while Pwm 2.0 is running, they are given the
option to watch a tutorial describing how to compose
encrypted email. This tutorial teaches users the cor-
rect order of operations for composing an encrypted
email. It also informs them about who can read their
message, the purpose of the optional greeting, and
where to type sensitive information.
Look and Feel
We designed a new website for helping users install Pwm
2.0.11 This website has a more professional look and
feel than the original Pwm website. This change was
made in reaction to user comments that they decide how
much they trust a tool based on how professional the
tool’s website looks. To make Pwm 2.0 also feel more
professional, we standardized its look and feel to use the
same colors and styles as the website.
Automatic and Manual Encryption
The original version of Pwm automatically encrypts and
sends email as soon as the user clicks Send encrypted
(Figure 4). We created a manual encryption version that
splits this operation into two distinct steps. In the first
step, instead of clicking the Send encrypted button, the
user instead clicks the Encrypt button. Upon doing so,
the user’s email message is encrypted, and both the in-
structions for decrypting the email message and the en-
crypted ciphertext are shown to the user inside Gmail’s
compose interface (Figure 7). This allows the user to
confirm that encryption has actually taken place. In the
second step, the user then clicks Gmail’s Send button to
send the encrypted email.
11
https://pwm.byu.edu
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Figure 7. Ciphertext shown to users after manual encryp-
tion
METHODOLOGY
This section gives an overview of our IRB-approved user
study that evaluated Pwm 2.0. This study was also used
to run a between-subjects A/B test comparing automatic
and manual encryption. The data from this study is
available at https://uist2016.isrl.byu.edu.
We were careful to design the study to test a generic se-
cure email system, rather than specifically testing Pwm
2.0. This approach helps us to feel more confident that
participants were interacting with Pwm 2.0 in a realistic
fashion. To help with this goal, we included researchers
who are not involved in our secure email research in de-
signing the scenarios and tasks. After creating scenarios
and tasks that were acceptable to all parties, we then
conducted a pilot study with three participants. We did
not identify any significant flaws during the pilot study.
Study Setup
The study ran for two weeks (February 17, 2015 through
March 3, 2015) and included 52 participants that were
randomly assigned to test either the automatic or man-
ual encryption version of Pwm 2.0.12 Participants took
30 to 60 minutes to complete the study and were com-
pensated $10 USD for their efforts.
Studies were conducted in a room dedicated for this
study. When participants first entered the room, they
were read a brief introduction to the study. All subse-
quent instructions were written and provided either via
a printed information sheet or via email. Participants
completed all tasks on a virtual machine, ensuring that
12Our power analysis (α = 0.05, β = 0.80) indicated that we
would need 23 participants in each treatment group to rea-
sonably detect differences in SUS scores and task completion
time. In contrast, our power analysis revealed that detecting
even medium sized (10%) differences in our proportional mea-
sures would require 387 participants in each treatment group
(far beyond our group’s ability to recruit participants). As
such, the proportional measures should only be evaluated as
trends, and not as statistically significant.
the computer started in the exact same state for all par-
ticipants. We also recorded participants’ screens.
Two study coordinators were involved in the study. One
coordinator sat in the same room as the participant,
and was instructed to avoid prompting participants and
to only assist participants if they had not made any
progress within five minutes. The second coordinator
sat in another room and corresponded with the partici-
pant over email as part of the study tasks.
Quality Control
One participant was unable to use Pwm 2.0 with their
Gmail account. This participant had a special Gmail
configuration that was not compatible with our tool.
While this participant did complete the study using a
temporary email account we provided them, we were
worried that their increased interactions with the study
coordinator might bias their responses, and so we dis-
carded their results. For the remainder of this work, we
report results based on the 51 remaining participants.13
Participant Demographics
We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local uni-
versity. Participants were evenly split between genders:
male (25; 49%), female (26; 51%). Participants skewed
young: 18–24 years old (45; 88%), 25–34 years old (3;
6%), 35–44 years old (2; 4%), 55 years or older (1; 2%).
We distributed posters broadly across campus to avoid
biasing our results by any particular major. All par-
ticipants were affiliated with the university,14 with the
overwhelming majority being undergraduate students:
undergraduates (44; 86%), graduates (2; 4%), faculty
and staff (5; 10%). Participants had a variety of majors,
including both technical and non-technical majors. No
major was represented by more than three participants,
with the vast majority having only a single participant.
Most participants indicated they logged into Gmail on
the web to check their email frequently: many times a
day (39; 76%), once a day (3; 6%), 2–3 times a week (2;
4%), once a week (2; 4%), 2–3 times a month (2, 4%).
Scenario and Task Design
During the course of the study, participants were given
two scenarios to complete: (1) being hired for a new
job, and (2) sending credit card information to a spouse.
Prior to beginning each scenario, participants were pro-
vided with a written description of the scenario and in-
formation that participants should send in place of their
own personal information.15 Participants were asked to
treat this sensitive information with the same care as
they would treat their own information.
13After analyzing the remaining data, we reviewed the re-
moved participant’s results and found that they were in line
with the results we analyzed.
14We did not require this affiliation.
15We took this approach to avoid situations where sensitive
information might have been leaked to Gmail.
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For each scenario we designed realistic tasks that used
as many email features as possible. Participants com-
pleted tasks in the order shown below. Tasks were com-
pleted entirely using email, and participants used their
own email accounts. If participants accidentally sent sen-
sitive information without encryption, they were notified
of their mistake in an email and asked to resend the in-
formation using encryption.
Being hired for a new job
Participants were told that they had recently returned
from an interview at National Citadel, a fictitious com-
pany created for this study.
Task 1. Participants received an email from National
Citadel containing instructions on how to be reimbursed
for expenses from their recent interview. Participants
were told to send their Social Security number and a
picture of their receipts. They were informed that this
information must be encrypted as per National Citadel’s
policies. This email also instructed users to set up and
use Pwm 2.0 to encrypt their email messages.
This task was designed to test whether participants were
able to set up and use Pwm 2.0 using only instructions
that might be reasonably expected from a company re-
questing information to be encrypted.
Task 2. Participants were asked to simulate several
weeks passing after the completion of task by closing
their browser and then reopening Gmail. Participants
were then sent an encrypted email that contained an offer
letter. They were asked to reply with their acceptance
and to CC their new manager.
This task was designed to test whether participants
would remember how to enable Pwm 2.0. It also tested
whether they could use Pwm 2.0 to CC a new recipient.
Task 3. Participants were sent an email instructing
them to email information to a background check com-
pany. They were instructed to encrypt the information.
This task was designed to test whether users could enable
encryption, either by forwarding the request for informa-
tion or by composing a new email message.
Task 4. Participants were instructed to send bank ac-
count information to National Citadel’s payroll depart-
ment. They were not reminded to encrypt this informa-
tion.
This task was designed to test whether users would re-
member to encrypt information if they were not explic-
itly prompted to do so. Unlike the preceding tasks, if
they sent information without encryption, we still con-
sidered this task complete.
Sending credit card information to a spouse
Participants were told that their spouse had texted them
asking for login information to a credit card website.
Task 5. Participants were instructed to send login in-
formation to their “spouse” using encrypted email. Par-
ticipants were told that their spouse had never before
used secure email, so they should take whatever steps
they felt necessary to ensure their spouse could read the
encrypted email.
This task was designed to see how participants would
induct a new person into using secure email. Regardless
of what instructions were sent, we considered this task
complete when the information had been sent.16
Task 6. Participants received another email from their
spouse asking them for additional credit card informa-
tion. This request was not encrypted and did not in-
struct the participant to send the additional credit card
information encrypted.
This task was designed to test whether users would re-
member to encrypt information if they were not explic-
itly prompted to do so. Unlike most of the preceding
tasks, if they sent information without encryption, we
still considered this task complete.
Using the video recording of participants’ screens, we
measured how long they took completing each task and
how often they sent sensitive email without encryption
(i.e., made a mistake).
Study Questionnaire
We administered our study using the Qualtrics web-
based survey software. Before beginning the survey, par-
ticipants were read an introduction by the study coor-
dinator and asked to answer a set of demographic ques-
tions. Participants then completed the six study tasks,
following which they were asked to complete a question-
naire regarding their experience.
To measure perceived usability, we had participants com-
plete the ten System Usability Scale (SUS) questions [4,
5]. Answers to these questions are used to derive each
version’s SUS score, a single numeric score from 0, the
least usable, to 100, the most usable, that provides a
rough estimate of the version’s overall usability. Recent
research has shown that SUS scores are effective for com-
paring systems across different study populations and
that SUS gives more reliable results than other usability
metrics [23, 19, 17].
After completing the SUS questions, participants were
asked several questions regarding whether they would
want to use Pwm 2.0 in their day-to-day lives. We
then asked participants questions to examine how well
they understood the cryptographic properties of Pwm
2.0. To test understanding of confidentiality, they were
asked to indicate which parties could read a message
encrypted with Pwm 2.0. Similarly, participants were
asked whether Pwm 2.0 provided authenticity and in-
tegrity for secure email messages composed with Pwm
2.0. Each question was asked in language that would
be approachable to users and did not require a technical
16Pwm 2.0 includes instructions by default, and since they
were sufficient to help the participant start using Pwm 2.0, it
was reasonable to assume that the participant believed they
would be sufficient to help their spouse start using Pwm 2.0.
7
C
ou
n
t
M
ea
n
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
C
on
fi
d
en
ce
In
te
rv
a
l
(α
=
0.
0
5
)
Automatic 27 79.1 9.6 ±3.69
Manual 24 81.1 9.0 ±3.60
Overall 51 80.0 9.2 ±2.52
Original Pwm Study 72 74.2 13.7 ±3.16
Table 1. SUS scores
background. Participants were given the option to in-
dicate that they were unsure whether a given property
was provided by Pwm 2.0.
Limitations
While our study included students with a diverse set of
majors and technical expertise, it may not be representa-
tive of non-student populations. Likewise, Gmail users
may also not be representative of the general popula-
tion’s preferences regarding secure email. Our study is
short-term and is not necessarily representative of how
participants would use secure email over a longer period
of time. Further studies could address these limitations.
Our study is a lab study and has limitations common to
all studies run in a trusted environment [13, 22]. While
there are indications that some participants treated the
provided sensitive information as they would their own
(e.g., refusing to email the provided social security num-
ber), there is no guarantee that participants’ reactions
mimic their real life behaviors. Additionally, our studies
did not test participants’ ability to resist attacks.
RESULTS
In this section we report the quantitative results from
our user study.
Usability
We evaluated Pwm 2.0 using the System Usability Scale
(SUS). The automatic encryption version of Pwm 2.0
had a SUS score of 79.1 and the manual encryption ver-
sion had a SUS score of 81.1. Further breakdown of
the SUS scores, along with SUS scores from the original
Pwm study [16], can be found in Table 1. The dif-
ference between manual encryption was not statistically
significant (two tailed student t-test, unequal variance—
p = 0.43). The difference between Pwm 2.0’s overall SUS
score (80.0) and Pwm’s SUS score (74.2) is statistically
significant (two tailed student t-test, unequal variance—
p < 0.01).
To give greater context for Pwm 2.0’s SUS score, we
leverage the work of several researchers. Bangor et al.
[3] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys, and derived a set of ac-
ceptability ranges that describe whether a system with
a given score is acceptable to users in terms of usability.
Bangor et al. also associated specific SUS scores with
adjective descriptions of the system’s usability. Using
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Automatic 27 4:06 4:00 3:01 1:20 4:01 0:54 17:22
Manual 24 5:10 3:48 3:03 1:08 3:44 0:50 17:43
Overall 51 4:37 3:54 3:02 1:14 3:52 0:52 17:32
Table 2. Average task completion times (min:sec)
this data, we generated ranges for these adjective rat-
ings, such that a score is correlated with the adjective
it is closest to in terms of standard deviations. Sauro et
al. [18] also analyzed SUS scores from Bangor et al. [2],
Tullis et al. [23], and their own data. They calculate the
percentile values for SUS scores and assign letter grades
based on percentile ranges.
Using these contextual clues, Pwm 2.0’s SUS score of
80.0 is rated as having “excellent” usability and given
an “A” grade. It is in the 87th percentile for system
usability.
Task Completion Times
For each task, we calculated the average time between
when the user could start a task and when they fin-
ished that task. These are shown in Table 2. For Tasks
2–6, and for the study as a whole, any differences be-
tween manual and automatic encryption were negligi-
ble. Task 1 had a statistically significant difference (two
tailed student t-test, unequal variance—p = 0.04), but
we caution against overemphasizing this result. First,
while the difference is significant, the 95% confidence in-
terval indicates that the actual effect size might be small
(64 ± 60 seconds). Second, any differences in task com-
pletion times are amortized over the remaining tasks.
Finally, a single statistically significant difference could
arguably be the result of alpha inflation [19].
Understanding
We asked three questions to determine whether each par-
ticipant understood the confidentiality, authenticity, and
integrity properties provided by Pwm 2.0. The responses
indicated whether each participant correctly understood
the principle, had some misunderstanding, or was un-
sure. Overall, our data suggests that over 50% of users
would likely understand the security provided by Pwm
2.0 (Adjusted-Wald binomial confidence interval [19],
α = 0.05—Confidentiality–83% ± 10%, Authenticity–
62%± 13%, Integrity–75%± 12%). In all cases, the dif-
ferences between manual and automatic encryption were
not statistically significant.
The proportion of users who understood how Pwm 2.0
was protecting their email was much higher than the rate
reported in the original Pwm study.17 Still, it is interest-
ing that even with tutorials that explicitly instruct par-
17We do not calculate statistical significance for these two pro-
portions as they were derived from different questions. Note
that the understanding questions for Pwm 2.0 were stricter
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Automatic 27 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Manual 24 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
Overall 51 3 0 2 1 0 0 6
Table 3. Number of participants who sent sensitive infor-
mation without encryption
ticipants on these three cryptographic properties, there
are still a small number of participants who were un-
sure how their messages were protected. This indicates
that more work needs to be done to determine how to
effectively teach users about these properties.
Avoiding Mistakes
During the study, we recorded all instances of a par-
ticipant taking an action that deviated from the study
parameters. Using this data, we identified several in-
stances where a participant’s actions leaked sensitive in-
formation. These results are reported by task in Table 3.
During the study, two participants sent sensitive infor-
mation without ever running Pwm 2.0, and another re-
freshed the Gmail page but did not restart Pwm 2.0 be-
fore sending sensitive information. In all three cases, the
mistakes were caused by the misuse of the tool and oc-
curred before participants had ever seen any differences
in the two versions of Pwm 2.0. For this reason, they
are reported in the overall number of mistakes, but not
under automatic or manual encryption. The differences
between mistakes related to manual and automatic en-
cryption are negligible.
Overall the rate of mistakes was extremely low (2%, 6
tasks out of 306). This is lower than the mistake rate re-
ported in the original Pwm study of 10%, and the differ-
ence is statistically significant (N−1 two-proportion test
for comparing two independent proportions–p = 0.001).
Tutorials
We noted the number of participants that completed
each tutorial. The video recording for one participant’s
session was corrupted, and we were unable to deter-
mine if they had completed the tutorials. The data from
the remaining 50 participants indicate that participants
completed a significant number of tutorials: introduc-
tory tutorial (46; 92%), tutorial on reading secure email
(46; 92%), tutorial on composing secure email (27; 54%).
This is in stark contrast to the original Pwm study where
nearly all participants ignored both the setup instruc-
tions and a video tutorial included on the Pwm web-
site [16]. This result indicates that participants are will-
ing to watch tutorials, though two criteria seem to be
than those used in the original Pwm study, emphasizing how
much better understanding in Pwm 2.0 is likely to be.
crucial: they appear in-page as participants need them
and they contain simple and direct wording.18
Acceptability of Pwm 2.0
Overall, participants responded very positively to the
prospect of using Pwm 2.0 in their own lives: 82%
of participants agreed with the statement “I want to
start using Pwm”19 (81% ± 11%).20 73% of partici-
pants agree that “I would use Pwm with my friends and
family” (71% ± 12%). 92% of participants agreed that
“My friends and family could easily start using Pwm”
(90% ± 8%). There were no significant differences be-
tween participants who used the automatic or manual
versions of Pwm 2.0.
Due to the nature of the study, it is likely that partic-
ipant responses were overly positive, and that the pro-
portions are somewhat high. Nevertheless, this data sug-
gests that if introduced to Pwm 2.0, a non-negligible
number of participants would want to continue using it,
and would feel comfortable using it to send encrypted
email to their friends and family.
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss noteworthy items, including
participant experiences, opinions, and preferences re-
garding secure email and lessons learned from improving
Pwm. We refer to participants here as R1–R52, with
the number corresponding to the order in which they
participated in our study.
Automatic and Manual Encryption
Our results indicate no significant differences between
automatic and manual encryption. As such, we hypoth-
esize that the effect observed in the original Pwm study
was due to confounding factors between the two systems
being studied (i.e., automatic encryption–Pwm, man-
ual encryption–MessageProtector).21 Alternatively, it is
possible that manual encryption would have benefited
Pwm’s original implementation, but that the modifica-
tions we made while creating Pwm 2.0 were sufficient to
provide those same benefits.
Pwm 2.0’s High Usability
Pwm 2.0’s SUS score of 80 falls in the 87th percentile for
system usability [19], and is the highest score for secure
email systems [16, 14]—Mailvelope (35, 4th percentile),
18We believe fewer participants watched the compose tutorial,
which appeared the first time participants clicked on Gmail’s
“Compose” button, because it was not clear they needed to
see it at this point and because the tutorial drew attention
to the option that they could skip it. Better tutorial design
could possibly address this issue.
19In the study, Pwm 2.0 was referred to as just Pwm.
20The confidence intervals reported here were calculated using
the Adjusted-Wald binomial confidence interval, α = 0.05.
21This hypothesis is supported by similar results in Atwater
et al.’s work [1].
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Tutanota (52, ~15th), Encipher.it (61, ~30th), Voltage
(62, ~32nd), Virtru (72, 63rd), original Pwm (74, 70th).22
Additionally, most participants understood how Pwm
2.0 was protecting their messages, only rarely made mis-
takes, and were interested in using Pwm 2.0 with their
friends and family. These positive opinions were also re-
flected in numerous positive qualitative responses. For
example, R26, R39, and R42 expressed, respectively,
“It was very concise and user friendly and did not
require esoteric knowledge to operate. I would defi-
nitely feel more comfortable sending sensitive infor-
mation over email if I were using Pwm versus just
sending it via an email provider.”
“I liked how I could encrypt sensitive information
like bank account information, credit card, and other
things. It wasn’t that hard to use. I didn’t have to
download anything; all I had to do was just save a
bookmark and then click on it. It was really easy to
use.”
“I liked how it made encrypting important infor-
mation so easy. The tutorial was fast and easy. I
like that it is easy and convenient to use with day to
day emails. I liked that the background was blue so
I knew when it was encrypting.”
Delayed Encryption
While we did not specifically collect data regarding users’
opinions toward our delayed encryption mechanism, we
note that not a single participant complained about en-
cryption being too fast. This is especially significant
when compared to the original Pwm study, where over
33% of participants self-reported that encryption was
too fast and therefore untrustworthy. The difference be-
tween these two proportions is statistically significant
(N − 1 two-proportion test for comparing two indepen-
dent proportions–p < 0.001). While this may not mean
that users’ concerns regarding the speed of encryption
were eliminated, it is strongly suggestive that they were
reduced enough not to be a distraction.
Mixed mode email
The optional plaintext greeting that can accompany
email encrypted by Pwm 2.0 is intended to help email
senders give confidence to recipients who have never used
Pwm 2.0 that the email is authentic and not spam. Sur-
prisingly, during our study we noted that a small, but
significant number of users would include a plaintext
greeting in many of their encrypted email messages. For
example, in Task 4 eight participants (8; 16%) including
a greeting stating that they were sending their direct
deposit information. Interestingly, this was actually a
feature that seven participants (7; 14%) listed as one of
their favorite features of Pwm 2.0. R12 and R51 stated,
respectively,
22Neither Message Protector [16] or Atwater et al.’s system [1]
had functioning key management, so their scores are not re-
ported here.
“It wasn’t rigid, I could write part of a message and
have the other parts encrypted if I wanted. It was
very clear what was encrypted and what wasn’t [...]”
“That it lets me chose when to encrypt and when
not to. It’s also nice to have the option of writing
a message before the encrypted part so others know
it’s not spam.”
Look and Feel
Participants indicated that having a color-scheme that
was distinct from Gmail helped them more easily under-
stand what information was encrypted and what infor-
mation was in the clear. This intuitive understanding
potentially helped participants avoid mistakenly enter-
ing sensitive information where it would not be pro-
tected. Additionally, participants mentioned that it
helped them feel more confident in the system. Thus it
is clear that when designing tightly integrated systems,
it is important to have a distinct look and feel.
Instructing New Users
Even though Pwm 2.0 automatically inserts instructions
on how to setup and use Pwm 2.0 in every encrypted
message, most participants were unaware of this. Dur-
ing Task 5, participants would often spend several min-
utes trying to open an old Pwm 2.0 message to grab
the instructions, only to have the message immediately
decrypted and the instructions disappear. It would be
helpful to make it more clear that these instructions are
always included or to add an option that allows users to
explicitly add these instructions.
CONCLUSION
Our modifications to Pwm’s interface have significantly
increased its usability and security. In our user study,
Pwm 2.0 is rated with an 80.0 SUS score, the highest
reported SUS score for secure email systems. Over 80%
of participants expressed a desire to begin using Pwm,
and over 90% of participants believed that their friends
and family could easily start using Pwm. Pwm 2.0 also
helped participants avoid mistakenly sending their sen-
sitive data in the clear.
This work represents an important step toward provid-
ing usable, secure email encryption. While Pwm 2.0 has
lower theoretical security than PGP-based systems, it
provides higher practical security for an ordinary user.
In studies of PGP-based systems, most users were un-
able to encrypt their emails [26, 21, 15], but in Pwm 2.0
all users are able to encrypt their emails. While there is
little evidence that PGP-based systems will ever be suffi-
ciently usable for the masses [12], techniques from Pwm
2.0 could be applied to PGP-based systems to raise their
relative usability.
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